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ABSTRACT 
In the age of big data, companies and governments are increasingly using algorithms to inform 
hiring decisions, employee management, policing, credit scoring, insurance pricing, and many 
more aspects of our lives. AI systems can help us make evidence-driven, efficient decisions, but 
can also confront us with unjustified, discriminatory decisions wrongly assumed to be accurate 
because they are made automatically and quantitatively. It is becoming evident that these 
technological developments are consequential to people’s fundamental human rights. Despite 
increasing attention to these urgent challenges in recent years, technical solutions to these 
complex socio-ethical problems are often developed without empirical study of societal context 
and the critical input of societal stakeholders who are impacted by the technology. On the other 
hand, calls for more ethically- and socially-aware AI often fail to provide answers for how to 
proceed beyond stressing the importance of transparency, explainability, and fairness. Bridging 
these socio-technical gaps and the deep divide between abstract value language and design 
requirements is essential to facilitate nuanced, context-dependent design choices that will 
support moral and social values. In this paper, we bridge this divide through the framework of 
Design for Values, drawing on methodologies of Value Sensitive Design and Participatory Design 
to present a roadmap for proactively engaging societal stakeholders to translate fundamental 
human rights into context-dependent design requirements through a structured, inclusive, and 
transparent process. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Predictive, classifying, and profiling algorithms of a wide range of complexity — from decision 
trees to deep neural networks — are increasingly impacting our lives as individuals and 
societies. Companies and governments seize on the promise of artificial intelligence (AI) to 
provide data-driven, efficient, automatic decisions in domains as diverse as human resources, 
policing, credit scoring, insurance pricing, healthcare, and many more. However, in recent years 
the use of algorithms has raised major socio-ethical challenges, such as discrimination (Angwin 
et al., 2016; Barocas and Selbst, 2016), unjustified action (Citron and Pasquale, 2014; Turque, 
2012), privacy infringement (Kosinski et al., 2013; Kosinski and Wang, 2018), spread of 
disinformation (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, 2018), job market effects of automation 
(European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, 2018a; Servoz, 2019), and safety 
issues (Eykholt et al., 2018; Wakabayashi, 2018). 
It is becoming evident that these technological developments are consequential to 
fundamental human rights (Gerards, 2019; Raso et al., 2018) and the moral and social values 
they embody (e.g. human dignity, freedom, equality). The past decade has seen increasing 
attention to these urgent challenges within the technical, philosophical, ethical, legal, and social 
disciplines. However, collaboration across disciplines remains nascent. Engineering solutions to 
complex socio-ethical problems, such as discrimination, are often developed without a nuanced 
empirical study of societal context surrounding the technology, including the needs and values 
of affected stakeholders. As Selbst et al. (2019: 59) point out, most current approaches 
“consider the machine learning model, the inputs, and the outputs, and abstract away any 
context that surrounds [the] system.” This gap puts technical implementations at risk of falling 
into the formalism trap, failing to “account for the full meaning of social concepts such as 
fairness, which can be procedural, contextual, and contestable, and cannot be resolved through 
mathematical formalisms” (Selbst et al., 2019: 61). On the other hand, calls for more ethically- 
and socially-aware AI often fail to provide answers for how to proceed beyond stressing the 
importance of transparency, explainability, and fairness. Bridging these socio-technical gaps is 
essential for designing algorithms and AI that address stakeholder needs consistent with human 
rights. We support the call of Selbst et al. to do so by shifting away from a solutions-oriented 
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approach to a process-oriented approach that “draws the boundary of abstraction to include 
social actors, institutions, and interactions” (Selbst et al., 2019: 60). 
In this paper, we bridge this socio-technical divide through the framework of Design for 
Values (Van den Hoven et al., 2015), drawing on methodologies of Value Sensitive Design 
(Friedman, 1997; Friedman et al., 2002; Friedman and Hendry, 2019) and Participatory Design 
(Schuler and Namioka, 1993). We present a roadmap for proactively engaging societal 
stakeholders to translate fundamental human rights into context-dependent design 
requirements through a structured, inclusive, and transparent process. Our approach shares the 
vision of Tubella et al. (2019) of applying Design for Values in AI and echoes other recent calls 
for incorporating societal and stakeholder values in AI design (Franzke, 2016; Rahwan, 2018; 
Simons, 2019; Umbrello and De Bellis, 2018; Zhu et al., 2018). In this work, we make an explicit 
choice of grounding the design process in the values of human dignity, freedom, equality, and 
solidarity, inspired by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU) (Official 
Journal of the European Union, 2012). Our intention is to demonstrate how AI can be designed 
for values that are core to societies within the EU. Although human rights are not unproblematic 
or uncontroversial (Hopgood, 2013), the EU Charter represents the most widely shared and 
institutionalized consensual set of values and ethical principles among EU member states. At the 
same time, it is important to recognize at the outset that alternative value choices are likely in 
other cultures and socio-political systems. We should also make clear the distinction between 
legal interpretation of human rights through, for example, case law versus the notion of human 
rights as embodying particular moral and social values, such as human dignity. In this work we 
focus on the latter — human rights as moral and social values to be designed for. This distinction 
is significant because engaging stakeholders to design for values (rather than established law 
and standards) can lead to design requirements that go beyond the present scope of the law.    
The presented design roadmap, with its anchoring in human rights, stakeholder 
involvement, and an established body of socio-technical design methodologies, is a tractable 
manifestation of the types of design approaches called for by the ethics guidelines of the 
European Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on AI (2019) and the European Group on 
Ethics in Science and New Technologies (2018b). The following sections are organized as 
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follows: Section 2 provides a brief introduction to Design for Values with an overview of 
stakeholder engagement methods from Value Sensitive Design and Participatory Design; in 
Section 3, we present our contribution, adopting fundamental human rights as top-level 
requirements that will guide the design process described in Section 2 and demonstrate the 
implications for a range of AI application contexts and key stakeholder considerations; in Section 
4, we discuss future steps needed to implement our roadmap in practice.  
2. DESIGN FOR VALUES 
The term Design for Values (Van den Hoven et al., 2015) refers to the explicit translation of 
moral and social values into context-dependent design requirements. It encompasses under one 
umbrella term a number of pioneering methodologies, such as Value Sensitive Design 
(Friedman, 1997; Friedman et al., 2002; Friedman and Hendry, 2019), Values in Design (Flanagan 
et al., 2008; Nissenbaum, 2005), and Participatory Design (Schuler and Namioka, 1993). Over 
the past decades, these approaches have opened up the design focus from technological 
artifacts and technical requirements to include a proactive consideration of the societal context 
in which the technology is embedded, and how societal needs and values can be translated into 
socio-technical design requirements. Bringing the societal context into play is often 
characterized by empirical research and proactive involvement of direct and indirect 
stakeholders affected by the technology throughout the design process. We would like to 
highlight that design requirements can be both social and technical in nature (hence socio-
technical), reflecting an interplay of human and technical artifacts and processes. That includes 
interactions between humans and technical artifacts, but also importantly human-to-human 
interactions and organizational practices.  
The gradual translation of abstract values into design requirements is referred to as value 
specification and can be visually mapped as a values hierarchy (Van de Poel, 2013) (Figure 1a). 
First, values are expanded into norms, which are properties or capabilities that the designed 
technology should exhibit in order to support desired values. For instance, the value privacy 
(Figure 1b) may in a certain context be interpreted as implying informed consent, 
confidentiality, and right to erasure. Thus, these three norms are viewed by the stakeholders as 
the specification of what the value privacy means in that context of use. Each of these norms is  
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(a) (b) 
Figure 1. Values hierarchy (a) visually maps the context-dependent specification of values into norms and socio-
technical design requirements. For instance, the value privacy (b) may in a certain context be interpreted by 
stakeholders as the ability of individuals to provide informed consent to processing of their personal data, its 
confidentiality, and the ability to erase personal data from the system. In turn, each of these properties is linked to 
a design requirement to be implemented. 
in turn specified further into a socio-technical design requirement. For example, in Figure 1b, 
informed consent to processing of personal data is to be implemented as positive opt-in 
(requires explicit permission) and confidentiality is to be implemented in terms of homomorphic 
encryption techniques. These again can be further specified. 
Note that the relation between higher levels and lower levels in the hierarchy is not 
deductive (Van de Poel, 2013). The norms in the example above may be insufficient or entirely 
irrelevant interpretations of privacy in a different context of use. Parties to the debate about 
privacy may disagree with the proposed decomposition. The value hierarchy offers a structure 
to have a focused debate about these disagreements. Detailed proposals for change can be 
made and discussed between stakeholders. Therefore, value specification provides an 
explication of an abstract value and is always context-dependent. In the opposite direction, the 
link between a lower level element (L) in the hierarchy and a higher level element (H) is 
characterized by a for the sake of relation. L being done for the sake of H can embody a number 
of more specific relations (Van de Poel, 2013): 
1) L is a means to H. 
2) L is a goal, the achievement of which contributes to the achievement of H. 
3) L enables the achievement of H without itself contributing directly to that 
achievement. 
4) L removes an obstacle to H. 
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Each of these relations can be further elaborated by the stakeholders in a specific context. For 
example, what are the societal, ethical, and human rights considerations that lead stakeholders 
to conclude that a right to erasure is a means to privacy? Hence, the for the sake of relation 
captures stakeholders’ contextual reasoning and motivations for requiring that a higher level 
element H (e.g. privacy) is supported by a lower level element L (e.g. right to erasure). This 
nuanced, context-dependent, stakeholder-formulated argumentation of design requirements is 
an essential mechanism for bridging the socio-technical gap. It facilitates an inclusive, socially-
aware, cross-disciplinary conversation necessary to account for the breadth and depth of 
complex socio-ethical issues and value implications. 
A values hierarchy exposes in a structured and transparent fashion which moral and social 
values (normative requirements) the technology in question should support, what are the 
stakeholder interpretations of those values in the specific context of use, and what are the 
corresponding design requirements to be implemented. This allows all stakeholders — 
individuals affected by the technology’s operation, direct users, engineers, field experts, legal 
practitioners, etc. — to debate design choices in a manner that traces the reasons, advantages, 
and shortcomings of each choice to societal norms. Because of the traction and perspicuous 
representation of moral reasons that such a framework can provide, moral discussions about 
engineering design can contribute to moral learning, technical improvement, social legitimacy, 
and trust building between parties. In the following subsections, we review specific methods 
from Value Sensitive Design (Friedman and Hendry, 2019) and Participatory Design (Schuler and 
Namioka, 1993) that engage stakeholders to iteratively specify the requirements in the different 
levels of the hierarchy. 
2.1 Tripartite methodology 
The structure of the design process we propose to follow is based on the tripartite methodology 
of Value Sensitive Design, which integrates three types of investigations (Friedman et al., 2013): 
Conceptual investigations identify the stakeholders and values implicated by the 
technological artifact in the considered context and define value specifications. 
Empirical investigations explore stakeholders’ needs, views, and experiences in relation 
to the technology and the values it implicates. 
 
 
7 
 
Technical investigations implement and evaluate technical solutions that support the 
values and norms elicited from the conceptual and empirical investigations.  
It is important to highlight that the three types of investigations are iterative and integrative 
(Friedman et al., 2013) in that they are “meant to inform each other rather than be engaged as 
separate, modular activities. Investigations may overlap, happen in different orders, or 
intertwine with each other” (Davis and Nathan, 2015: 16). For example, a follow-up empirical 
investigation after an initial prototype implemented in the technical investigation may reveal 
value tensions that were not identified earlier, resulting in a new iteration of conceptual 
investigation.  
2.2 Engaging with stakeholders 
Stakeholders are engaged through a range of empirical methods, such as surveys, interviews, 
participant observation (Musante (DeWalt), 2015), card methods (Friedman and Hendry, 2012; 
Wölfel and Merritt, 2013), and participatory prototyping (Lim et al., 2008), to elicit their 
“understandings, concerns, reflections, and aspirations” (Davis and Nathan, 2015: 16). One 
useful instrument that can be combined with interviews is value scenarios (Nathan et al., 2007), 
which are nuanced imagined scenarios involving the proposed technology and various direct 
and indirect stakeholders. Value scenarios can help uncover “nefarious and unusual uses, value 
tensions, and longer-term societal implications that might otherwise go unnoticed” (Czeskis et 
al., 2010: 3). During interaction with stakeholders, Participatory Design encourages co-designers 
to explore alternative visions and be sensitive to silences (Van der Velden and Mörtberg, 2015). 
Exploring alternative visions involves postponing what may seem as the obvious technical 
solution to a complex socio-ethical problem in order to enable stakeholders “who otherwise 
might be invisible or marginalized to have a voice in the design process” (Van der Velden and 
Mörtberg, 2015: 53). This is yet another means through which the socio-technical gaps are 
bridged. It is also possible that during the design process some stakeholders may turn silent or 
be silenced. Therefore, it is essential to respect and be sensitive to silences, recognizing them as 
cues for taking a step back and reaffirming an inclusive, “democratic design space, which gives 
voice to all” (Van der Velden and Mörtberg, 2015: 54). 
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2.3 Local meaning and context 
Various authors have highlighted the moral importance of accommodating local meanings of 
social practices and language, e.g. (MacIntyre, 1981; Wittgenstein, 1953). Actions and language 
have meaning in a particular social practice, or institutional setting, which has a purpose or goal 
and has its own norms governing behavior in that setting. Our representations and design need 
to respect these social and normative contexts. In that regard, a key question that will often 
emerge during Design for Values in AI is to what extent an AI system should replace the actions 
of a human agent in performing a certain activity, considering the social, normative, and 
institutional purpose of that activity. A technique that can help address this question in a 
structured manner is what has been called “the Nature-of-Activities” approach (Santoni de Sio 
et al., 2014), which divides an activity into its goal-directed and practice-oriented aspects. To 
illustrate this, consider the example of using care robots for the activity of lifting a patient from 
a hospital bed, studied by Santoni de Sio and Van Wynsberghe (2016). This activity has the goal-
directed aspect of safely raising the patient out of bed at a certain angle and speed and safely 
placing her/him in a wheelchair. At the same time, the performance of this activity by a human 
care giver has the practice-oriented aspect of developing the bond and relationship between the  
care giver and the patient. This relationship has a social value for the patient and is also 
important for the patient’s long-term care: “to be honest about their symptoms, to take their 
medication and to comply with their care plan” (Santoni de Sio and Van Wynsberghe, 2016: 
1752).  
As another example, consider a university that would like to automate the task of advising 
students’ curriculum choices with algorithm-generated personalized curriculum plans. Normally, 
this activity is performed by a trained, experienced academic counselor in a one-on-one session 
with the student. It has the goal-directed aspect of recommending a curriculum that fits the 
students’ choice of specialization, past courses, and grades. But universities are more than 
efficient information transmission institutions. Their practices and life forms, their telos and 
supreme value is the pursuit of knowledge by building communities of learning and scholarship, 
which require open communication and trust. The advising activity has therefore also the 
practice-oriented aspect of building an informal and socially interactive companionship between 
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the student and a human counselor, who can help the student elicit interests that are outside of 
her/his initial comfort zone and provide emotional support in moments of anxiety. 
Adopting this type of perspective in the study of context helps to bridge socio-technical 
gaps by revealing valuable human-to-human interactions that may otherwise go unnoticed. 
Doing so can help identify which activities (or sub-tasks of an activity) are best delegated to an 
AI system and which are best delegated to a human. In fact, innovative interactions between 
humans and AI can emerge, where the division of tasks between the two satisfies stakeholder 
needs and values to a greater extent compared to either the human or AI performing the 
activity alone.  
3. HUMAN RIGHTS AS TOP-LEVEL REQUIREMENTS 
Our roadmap of Designing for Human Rights in AI begins with adopting the four values at the 
basis of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Official Journal of the European Union, 2012) — 
human dignity, freedom, equality, and solidarity — as top-level requirements that will guide the 
design process described in the previous section. We demonstrate the implications of values 
embodied by the Charter’s provisions for a range of AI application contexts and key stakeholder 
considerations, such as autonomy over self-representation, non-discrimination, privacy, 
transparency, and job market effects of automation. When viewed through the perspective of a 
values hierarchy, what follows are the elements of the top level of the hierarchy and an analysis 
of how values embodied by the Charter’s human rights provisions relate to and support each 
other.  
 
3.1 Dignity 
Human dignity is a foundational value in the EU Charter and is the central, overarching human 
value at stake in AI, be it in the context of discrimination, unjustified action, privacy violations, 
or job market transformations. As stated in the Charter’s official guiding explanations (Official 
Journal of the European Union, 2007: C 303/17): “dignity of the human person is not only a 
fundamental right in itself but constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights.” In this sense, 
dignity is a highly multifaceted concept. Ironically, one way to grasp the broad range of its 
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meanings is to explore what humans consider to be violations of their dignity, as done by 
Halbertal (2015), who points out the following three categories of violations:  
1) Humiliation: being put in a state of helplessness, insignificance; losing autonomy over 
your own representation. 
2) Instrumentalization: treating an individual as exchangeable and merely a means to an 
end. 
3) Rejection of one’s gift: making an individual superfluous, unacknowledging one’s 
contribution, aspiration, and potential. 
The AI-related impact on dignity can be more clearly seen through these three dimensions. For 
example, discrimination and unjustified action lead to humiliation, putting individuals in a state 
of helplessness when faced with opaque and biased algorithmic decisions. Job market effects of 
automation may cast whole communities of workers as superfluous and exchangeable for the 
more profitable alternative of AI. Large-scale collection of data for online advertisements 
exploits individuals as exchangeable data points that are merely a means to driving profits. As 
argued by the European Data Protection Supervisor (2015: 12), “better respect for, and the 
safeguarding of, human dignity could be the counterweight to the pervasive surveillance and 
asymmetry of power which now confronts the individual. It should be at the heart of a new 
digital ethics.”  
By examining dignity along the dimensions through which it can be violated, the human 
rights provisions of the EU Charter can be seen as providing a collective and mutually 
complementing response to the question of how to protect against violations of human dignity. 
In other words, the Charter is a manifestation of both rights and limitations which are in place 
for the sake of upholding human dignity. Table 1 highlights some of the Charter provisions that 
are especially relevant in AI contexts. To reflect its central, overarching role, dignity is placed at 
the root of our design roadmap as a first-order value (Figure 2). On the second order, follow 
four key values fulfilling a for the sake of relation with respect to dignity: freedom, equality, 
solidarity, and right to life. Note that here we extend the use of the for the sake of relation to 
convey the intra-level relationships between different values. Placing the right to life (Article 2 
within the Dignity Title) on the same order as freedom, equality, and solidarity is motivated by 
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its direct relation to safety, which is a crucial consideration in AI contexts. The other three 
values have their own dedicated Title sections within the Charter, whose implications for AI we 
explore below.  
Table 1. Highlighted provisions from the Dignity, Freedom, Equality, and Solidarity Titles of the EU 
Charter (Official Journal of the European Union, 2012).  
Dignity 
(Title I) 
(Article 1, Human dignity): Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and 
protected. 
(Article 2, Right to life): Everyone has the right to life. 
  
 
 
Freedom 
(Title II) 
 
(Article 6, Right to liberty and security): Everyone has the right to liberty and security 
of person. 
(Article 8, Protection of personal data): Everyone has the right to the protection of 
personal data concerning him or her. Such data must be processed fairly for 
specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some 
other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data 
which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.  
(Article 11, Freedom of expression and information): Everyone has the right to 
freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers. 
  
Equality 
(Title III) 
(Article 21, Non-discrimination): Any discrimination based on any ground such as 
sex, race, color, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, 
political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, 
disability, age, or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. 
  
 
 
Solidarity 
(Title IV) 
(Article 34, Social  security  and  social  assistance): The Union recognizes and 
respects the entitlement to social security benefits and social services providing 
protection in cases such as maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency or 
old age, and in the case of loss of employment, in accordance with the rules laid 
down by Union law and national laws and practices… 
In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognizes and respects 
the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all 
those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules laid down by Union 
law and national laws and practices. 
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3.2 Freedom 
The content of the Freedom Title is strongly associated with individual autonomy. For example, 
the right to liberty in Article 6 protects individuals against arbitrary deprivation of physical 
freedom (Official Journal of the European Union, 2007). In the context of algorithmic systems, 
one sensitive area that is directly implicated by Article 6 is criminal justice, e.g. predictive 
policing systems and recidivism risk assessments. Predictions and judgements made by these 
algorithms are typically based on statistical correlations rather than causal evidence. This means 
that a person may be labeled as high risk simply because her/his demographics correlate with 
data gathered on previously arrested people. This clash of correlation vs. causation (Kitchin, 
2014; Rieder and Simon, 2017) brings out the wider issue of data determinism, a situation in 
which data collected about individuals and the statistical inferences drawn from that data are 
used to judge people on the basis of what the algorithm says they might do/be/become, rather 
than what the person actually has done and intends to do (Broeders et al., 2017). Data 
determinism therefore contributes to statistical dehumanization (Van den Hoven and Manders-
Huits, 2008) and is directly at odds with the autonomy of individuals to define themselves and 
their aspirations — autonomy over their own representation. Existing examples of such 
inferences go well beyond criminal justice and include talent and personality assessments for 
job candidate selection, employee performance assessments, financial credit scoring, and many 
more areas. Understanding the effects of these systems on autonomy over self-representation 
requires a critical look together with the affected stakeholders at the contextual nature of what 
an algorithm attempts to predict or evaluate — the target variable (Barocas and Selbst, 2016) — 
and its causal links to data used on the input. The conceptions of target variables in the 
examples above (criminal risk, personality traits, job performance, credit risk) are highly fluid, 
contextual, and contestable (Selbst et al., 2019). Algorithms remove this fluidity, context, and 
contestability by attempting to fix the conception to a set of quantifiable inputs and outputs. As 
a result, it is the algorithm’s conception that takes center stage, and that directly infringes 
people’s autonomy over self-representation, leading to data determinism and discrimination 
(Citron and Pasquale, 2014; Leese, 2014; Mann and Matzner, 2019). 
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The illustrated impact of data determinism underlines that the automatic and quantitative 
nature of AI must not be confused with objectivity. This also brings out the interplay between 
contestability, justification, and freedom. If the output of an employee performance assessment 
algorithm is uncontestable, receiving a high score requires employees to adapt their behavior in 
a manner that would conform with the algorithm’s conception of a ‘good employee’. In other 
words, in order to achieve a desired outcome, the freedom to act true to one’s own personality 
and wishes is compromised. As Wachter and Mittelstadt (2019: 20) argue, “such chilling effects 
linked to automated decision-making and profiling undermine self-determination and freedom 
of expression and thus warrant more control over the inferences that can be drawn about an 
individual.” Furthermore, people’s freedoms can be compromised without their awareness of 
being subjected to algorithmic profiling (Hildebrandt, 2008). As Hildebrandt (2008: 318) 
elaborates, “(1) an abundance of correlatable data and (2) the availability of relatively cheap 
technologies to construct personalised knowledge out of the data, create new possibilities to 
manipulate people into behaviour without providing adequate feedback on how their data have 
been used.” Therefore, individuals’ ability to enforce their autonomy significantly relies on their 
awareness of being subjected to algorithmic profiling and their ability to contest the rationale 
behind algorithmic decisions. In turn, for individuals to contest an algorithm and ensure that the 
burden of proof is first of all placed on the algorithm’s operator (Wachter and Mittelstadt, 
2019), socio-technical systems need to be sufficiently transparent to provide context-dependent 
legible justifications for their decisions and allow for case-specific discretion. In order to design 
for such transparency, it is essential to shape an understanding of what constitutes a legible 
justification and effective contestation mechanism together with societal stakeholders who 
would perform the contesting task in a given context. 
The second highlighted section from the Freedom Title, Article 8, provides important data 
privacy protections. The Article explicitly states that collected data should be processed “for 
specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other 
legitimate basis laid down by law” (Official Journal of the European Union, 2012: C 326/397). 
Additionally, every individual is provided with the right of "access to data which has been 
collected concerning him or her" (Official Journal of the European Union, 2012: C 326/397). In AI 
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contexts, these provisions have profound implications for privacy and transparency, considering 
the growing pervasiveness of profiling algorithms that base their outputs on large-scale data 
collection (Citron and Pasquale, 2014). There is again a substantive link here to individuals’ 
autonomy over self-representation, since privacy is essential for exercising that autonomy and 
protection from shaming or distortion of one’s personality (Velleman, 2005). This is something 
also understood as informational self-determination (Cavoukian, 2008). Designing for these 
provisions requires stakeholder consensus around which data are justifiably necessary for 
performance of a processing task, and which mechanisms should be in place for individuals to 
exercise access and conscious consent to the use of their personal data. 
We finalize the analysis of the Freedom Title with Article 11, which focuses on freedom of 
expression and information, ensuring that individuals have the autonomy of sharing and 
obtaining information without arbitrary impediment. On the information sharing front, this 
provision is directly linked to the ongoing debate on balancing freedom of speech versus hate 
speech, public shaming, and disinformation on social media and the Internet at large. On the 
information receiving front, these issues are intertwined with content personalization 
algorithms, such as news recommender systems, and their impact on information diversity (Bay, 
2018; Pariser, 2011), a necessary condition for a functioning democracy. These are examples of 
value tensions between different stakeholders. Explicitly recognizing these types of tensions and 
engaging in nuanced, context-specific deliberations that seek to resolve them are integral to the 
design process.  
 
3.3 Equality 
At the heart of the Equality Title is the principle of non-discrimination in Article 21, which 
explicitly prohibits any discrimination on grounds such as ethnical origin, gender, skin color, 
religion, sexual orientation, political opinions, disability, and more. For AI, this is another crucial 
consideration. Given the scale and speed at which these systems operate, algorithms that 
systematically disadvantage one demographic group or community vs. another can exacerbate 
historical discrimination, socio-economic gaps, and inequity (Citron and Pasquale, 2014; O’Neil, 
2016). Designing non-discriminating algorithms is particularly challenging considering that 
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discrimination can occur even when protected personal attributes, as those listed in the Equality 
Title, are excluded from the data (Barocas and Selbst, 2016) and the fact that non-discrimination 
is a highly contextual, contestable, and procedural concept that does not always lend itself to 
mathematical formalisms (Selbst et al., 2019). Therefore, designing for equality entails 
developing a nuanced understanding of present and historical social dynamics that contribute to 
discrimination in a given context and assessment of both social (e.g. organizational processes, 
policies, human-to-human interaction) and socio-technical means to address it. On the technical 
side, special attention needs to be devoted to discriminatory implications of choices for target 
variables, class labels, data collection gaps across different communities, and feature selection 
(Barocas and Selbst, 2016). Furthermore, algorithmic profiling can lead to new types of 
discrimination (Leese, 2014; Mann and Matzner, 2019) that systematically disadvantage 
individuals based on input data representations that have no direct connection to familiar 
protected grounds, such as gender or ethnical origin — consider the discussed examples of 
talent and employee performance assessments. Finally, designing for equality also entails 
designing for privacy to avoid situations in which exposure of personal data results in unjustified 
preferential treatment (Van den Hoven, 1997). This aspect once again requires stakeholders to 
reflect on what data are justifiably necessary for the performance of a given data processing 
task.  
 
3.4 Solidarity 
The Solidarity Title effectively stipulates a responsibility of members of society towards each 
other in “combat[ing] social exclusion…so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack 
sufficient resources” (Official Journal of the European Union, 2012: C 326/402). It recognizes 
that individuals’ ability to exercise their rights, and therefore uphold their dignity, can be 
compromised in circumstances such as “maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency or 
old age, and in the case of loss of employment” (Official Journal of the European Union, 2012: C 
326/402). This has important implications for design of AI. First, algorithmic systems that 
operate based on statistical correlations, by their nature make judgements based on the relative 
position of data collected about an individual with respect to the population sample the 
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algorithm was trained on. In other words, what matters is not the substance of circumstances 
and experiences of that individual (e.g. loss of employment, single parenthood, disability), but 
rather how they compare to the population sample — Vedder (1999) refers to this as de-
individualization. In many situations, this contradicts the empathetic spirit of the Solidarity Title 
because a nuanced, humane consideration of the dignity of the individual in question is replaced 
by an attempted mathematical measurement of where that individual stands compared to 
others. This again brings out the infringement on autonomy over self-representation by data 
determinism and the formalism trap issues discussed above. As a result, there is substantial risk 
that individuals and communities whose societal circumstances compromise their ability to 
exercise their rights may end up being pushed further to the fringes, introducing self-
perpetuating feedback loops and increasing socio-economic disparity and inequity (Citron and 
Pasquale, 2014; O’Neil, 2016). Some vivid examples are algorithms used for insurance pricing, 
financial credit scoring, and predictive policing. As in the case of the value freedom, autonomy 
over self-representation and transparency of decision-making (including legible justification and 
effective contestation mechanisms) are essential in design for solidarity.  Furthermore, to 
account for the far-reaching societal and economic impacts on various communities, relevant 
field experts should participate together with affected stakeholders in the translation of their 
concerns into context-dependent design requirements.  
The second major implication of the Solidarity Title relates to the impact of AI systems on 
the job market. Integration of decision-support systems, assisting robots, and self-driving 
vehicles has the potential to shift many workers out of their jobs, causing anxiety and political 
unrest. Involvement of direct and indirect stakeholders is essential to uncover both short and 
long-term implications of replacing entire jobs or automating specific tasks within a job. As 
illustrated in Section 2.3, it can be helpful to construct a nuanced understanding of the harm-
benefit tradeoffs of automation, revealing important stakeholder considerations that are not 
obvious at first sight. These tradeoffs may lead to a realization that designing for solidarity will 
involve interactions between humans and AI where the machine does not replace the human, 
but rather assists the human worker to perform her/his tasks in a more efficient and safer 
manner, perhaps even enhancing valuable human-to-human interactions. Furthermore, in some 
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contexts the tradeoffs will be dynamic in time. For example, consider a scenario in which public 
transport companies are deciding on the timeline for replacing their fleet with self-driving 
vehicles. Although a fast replacement may be feasible and profitable to the companies, it will 
result in large-scale layoffs, with many workers unlikely to be able to retrain to other available 
jobs on the market. On the other hand, a gradual replacement of the fleet would allow more 
transition time, during which employers and workers can develop training programs that will 
help workers extend their skillset and knowledge to be competitive in the changing job market. 
This example of course does not do justice to the full range and complexity of considerations at 
stake, but it illustrates the necessity to engage with needs and value tensions between different 
stakeholders in a nuanced and inclusive manner.  
 
3.5 Third-order values and context-dependent specification 
As illustrated by the above implications of fundamental human rights for AI systems, the 
second-order values in our design roadmap can be specified further into third-order values that 
are more familiar in discussions surrounding the ethics of AI: non-discrimination, privacy, 
transparency, and safety (Figure 2). This list is not exhaustive and is open to expansion and 
refinement. Notice that some of these third-order values fulfill a for the sake of relation with 
respect to more than one second-order value, reflecting the value relationships analyzed above. 
For example, the value privacy supports both freedom and equality, while transparency 
supports both freedom and solidarity. From here onward, further specification of these values 
and their translation into system properties becomes highly context dependent. This is precisely 
where the methods outlined in Section 2 with the crucial involvement of societal stakeholders 
enter to elicit the normative and socio-technical implications of the higher order values in a 
specific context. As noted earlier, this design process requires iterating through several rounds 
of conceptual, empirical, and technical investigations. With each iteration, a more nuanced and 
broad understanding of normative requirements, value tensions, and socio-technical design 
requirements will emerge. The iterative, adaptive, and inclusive nature of this process is 
analogous to key principles behind Agile software development (Beck et al., 2001). This offers 
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Figure 2. Human rights as top-level requirements in the design roadmap. The dashed lines depict for the sake of 
relations between individual values. Further specification of values into context-dependent design requirements is 
achieved through stakeholder engagement, iterating through conceptual, empirical, and technical investigations. 
perhaps an unexpected opportunity to recognize similarities and possible bridges between 
practices employed by software engineers and the design approach presented here. 
It is to be expected that in some contexts and case scenarios the stakeholders may reach 
the conclusion that none of the proposed technical implementations sufficiently satisfy 
important normative requirements. On the one hand, this can be an opportunity for technical 
innovation, motivating outside of the box thinking that can lead to a successful resolution (Van 
den Hoven et al., 2012). On the other hand, as Selbst et al. (2019) caution, we should not fall 
into the solutionism trap (Morozov, 2013), assuming that some form of AI is always the solution 
to the problem or goal at hand. In fact, in situations where normative requirements cannot be 
matched with suitable implementations, the hierarchical nature of our design roadmap provides 
the means to trace exactly which norms, values, and ultimately human rights would be 
insufficiently supported or violated. In such scenarios, designing responsibly with respect to 
individuals’ human rights will demand recognizing that introduction of AI in that context will be 
harmful. The notion of rejecting AI solutions which fail to sufficiently fulfill normative 
requirements would not be different from the manner in which other technologies, such as cars, 
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airplanes, home appliances, and bridges are required to fulfill various certification standards 
whose purpose is to support values such as safety, accessibility, and environmental protection.  
4. FROM ROADMAP TO PRACTICE, MOVING FORWARD 
The roadmap presented in this paper opens up a range of practical questions concerning its 
implementation. For example, how and who determines the appropriate stakeholders in a given 
context? How to assess consensus among stakeholders? How and who determines if sufficient 
iterations have been made throughout the conceptual, empirical, and technical investigations? 
Is there a need for an external body or institution that would certify the integrity of the design 
process and ensure its transparency with respect to society?  
Some of these questions can be addressed by knowledge and experience accrued from 
past applications of Design for Values in various domains (Azenkot et al., 2011; Czeskis et al., 
2010; Friedman et al., 2006; Woelfer et al., 2011). However, many of these questions bring us to 
uncharted waters, much like AI itself. Moving forward depends on our willingness to put 
ambitious multidisciplinary ideas to the test, learn to communicate efficiently with stakeholders 
of diverse backgrounds, and build together the necessary socio-technical checks and balances at 
different scales. The starting point would be case studies focused on concrete contexts and 
stakeholders. Valuable knowledge can then be gathered about the performance of empirical 
methods for stakeholder engagement, the context-dependent requirements that emerge, and 
the socio-technical solutions and human-AI interactions the design roadmap leads to. With this 
interdisciplinary knowledge and experience we can transition from case studies to specific 
design protocols and certification procedures applicable to different social domains. As 
concluded in a recent Council of Europe report on discrimination and AI (Zuiderveen Borgesius, 
2018: 39), there is a need for “sector-specific rules, because different values are at stake, and 
different problems arise, in different sectors.” In the long term, applying the human rights-
based design roadmap as a basic building block in different contexts can gradually assemble the 
complex mosaic of AI that functions in synergy with fundamental human rights.  
There is also significant overlap in the spirit and substance of the presented design 
approach and the human rights due diligence and impact assessment processes advanced by 
the United Nations Guiding Principles (UNGP) on Business and Human Rights (United Nations, 
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2011). Both seek to proactively engage relevant stakeholders (UNGP Principle 18) in a nuanced 
debate about the societal impact of the technology in question and resolve identified risks 
(UNGP Principle 19). In the context of AI, there is a particularly strong connection between our 
approach and the Human Rights, Ethical and Social Impact Assessment (HRESIA) presented by 
Mantelero (2018) and the Algorithmic Impact Assessment presented by Reisman et al. (2018). 
HRESIA also puts emphasis on the socio-ethical dimension of human rights, going beyond a 
strictly legal assessment of implications, and stresses the importance of context study, including 
consultation with potentially affected stakeholders. It is important to highlight that while 
identifying negative impact (to put simply, what not) is certainly an indispensable part of Design 
for Values, at the heart of it is translating stakeholders’ positive needs and values (to put simply, 
what yes) into concrete design choices that support these needs consistent to values. Therefore, 
we believe that our design approach can complement human rights due diligence processes by 
providing a structured and inclusive path for formulating design requirements that address the 
concerns, needs, and expectations identified in a human rights impact assessment or an 
algorithmic impact assessment. For example, the values hierarchy mapping can help facilitate 
the debate among stakeholders by linking concrete components of the system in question with 
normative requirements they support. Such a decomposition of a complex socio-technical 
system helps to bridge between different levels of abstraction and makes the conversation 
among stakeholders more tractable, legible, and transparent. Thus, with its anchoring in a body 
of established inclusive design methodologies, such as Value Sensitive Design and Participatory 
Design, our approach offers practical tools that can support and further advance human rights 
due diligence processes consistent to the UNGP. 
Positioning the presented design approach within the framework of human rights due 
diligence can also help clarify the question of responsibility and roles of the state and private 
actors. Our view is that designing for human rights is first of all the responsibility of the entity 
(e.g. company, public agency) that introduces an AI system within a given societal context. This 
is consistent with the notion of corporate responsibility in the UNGP. More concretely, this 
means that these entities should seek to proactively study the societal context, forming a 
nuanced understanding of stakeholder needs and human rights implications, and formulate 
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design specifications in consultation with affected stakeholders. However, just as with various 
types of impact assessments, the state and democratic institutions should play a crucial role in 
oversight, verification, and adjudication of the design process. This includes mechanisms for 
adjudicating unresolved disputes between stakeholders and ensuring transparency of the design 
process in a manner that allows for public scrutiny. This is consistent with the notion of state 
duty in the UNGP. Thus, positioning the presented design approach within the framework of 
human rights due diligence can help address a number of practical questions related to 
responsibility and adjudication posed at the beginning of this section. Moving forward, it is of 
great interest to explore this in practice. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Major socio-ethical challenges raised by AI systems in recent years, such as discrimination, 
unjustified action, and job market effects of automation, have made it clear that this technology 
has direct impact on people’s fundamental human rights. It is for that reason that in this work 
we call for a proactive approach of Designing for Human Rights in AI. We have shown how the 
values at the basis of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights — human dignity, freedom, 
equality, and solidarity — relate to major issues at stake and translate into normative 
requirements that can guide a structured, inclusive, and transparent design process that will 
involve diverse stakeholders and help bridge existing socio-technical gaps.  
As noted at the outset, we made an explicit choice of focusing on values that are core to 
societies within the EU, as embodied by the EU Charter. Our view is that given the complex 
reality that interpretation of international human rights norms varies across different regions 
and socio-political systems, the ways in which different societies will design and incorporate AI 
technology will vary accordingly. Considering this diversity, had we based our analysis on a more 
global human rights instrument, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the analysis 
would likely have to be even more abstract to steer clear of imposing a particular geo-political 
perspective and call for follow-up studies on a more regional level. Therefore, while openly 
recognizing the limitations and inherent normative biases of the analysis presented in this 
paper, we focus on the more regionally coherent level of the EU. That said, it should be 
recognized that the EU itself comprises of diverse cultures and traditions. However, the very 
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tangible presence of the EU as a socio-political, legal fabric that unites these diverse countries 
under the values embodied by the EU Charter, allows for a tangible analysis of AI implications 
and design considerations with respect to human rights the way they are perceived across the 
EU. To be clear, we have no intention of imposing the EU view on human rights onto other 
regional contexts. We sincerely hope that this work can serve as an example of an inclusive 
design format that can be applied in other regional contexts, leading to designs that support 
human rights consistent to the views of different societies. 
Although this work is motivated in big part by the impact of AI on human rights, we should 
recognize that existing human institutions are highly imperfect themselves. However, it is also 
the case that despite these imperfections, significant progress has been made in advancement 
of human rights around the world during the 20th century and even over the past decades. And 
yet, there is a long way ahead. This again brings out the importance of designing from a joint 
socio-technical perspective. Technology can play a helpful role in advancing human rights, but 
as the discussed solutionism trap warns us, we should not mislead ourselves into believing that 
complex societal problems can be fixed by “smart” technology alone, which is often wrongly 
assumed to be ethically neutral and objective. It is therefore our hope that the presented design 
approach allows societies and institutions to engage in an inclusive and structured debate about 
how to advance the enjoyment of human rights in a manner that discovers the appropriate role 
AI can play in supporting humans. Designing for Human Rights should not be viewed as an 
obstacle to technical innovation. On the contrary, we believe that it is key to achieving 
innovative interactions between humans and AI systems in a manner that satisfies stakeholder 
needs consistent to moral and social values embodied by human rights. That does not mean 
that it is an easy path to tread: learning to communicate across disciplines, resolving value 
tensions between stakeholders, and recognizing that more automation and AI is not always the 
desired solution. However, the long-term benefits of this approach can be shared both by 
individuals whose dignity will be held paramount in a changing socio-technical landscape and 
engineers whose products will enjoy a higher level of acceptance and trust. 
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